1 0 MAY 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel White

At your request I visited the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare at Fort Bragg on 4 and 5 May. The main purpose of the visit was to determine whether it is useful both to the Center and to the Agency to continue to post a full-time Agency liaison officer there and to get a better idea of just exactly what this job amounts to.

The Center and were extremely 25X1 hospitable and laid on elaborate arrangements to acquaint me with the various programs of the Center. I had intensive meetings with General Stilwell, the Commanding Officer, and all of the senior members of his staff charged with running the Center's programs. All of the sessions were free flowing, frank, full, and useful.

I also had private sessions with to go over in detail the nature of his work. My impressions follow:

a. There is merit in continuing to keep a full-time liaison officer at the Center. For one thing, the emphasis given in the training and doctrine of the Special Forces with regard to counterinsurgency, civic action, unconventional warfare, etc., is very much akin to our own doctrine and programs in the PM and counterinsurgency fields. In my view, it is essential that the Agency be in position to keep the Center's programs and doctrine under constant review and watch to ensure that the Center's programs and our own are in general accord. This is a two-way street. As the Agency's doctrine, needs, and programs are revised, there is a need to keep our liaison officer informed so that the proper input can be made at the Special Warfare Center. There is no doubt in my mind that the Center will welcome all such advice or guidance.

b. The Special Forces missions, responsibilities, and training are so similar to our own that I view the Special Forces as presenting the Agency with potential opportunities

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for use in our own operations under our control. To count on such use is no doubt difficult. For one thing, such use would involve policy considerations of serious importance at the Washington level. For another, there is precious little sentiment within the Agency for using military expertise of this kind. The point is, however, that skilled manpower for counterinsurgency and paramilitary programs is in short supply, and it is not in the Agency's interest to ignore the potential value of the Special Forces for our own operations. I can conceive, for example, of times and circumstances when Special Forces units in mufti might be of crucial value to us. In any event, it is in the Agency's interest to maintain a bridge between us, the Army, and the Special Forces.

c. If the need for such a bridge is recognized and agreed, it is in the Agency's interest to maintain full-time liaison, for we must be sensitive to what we can do to be of help in guiding the Special Forces and its programs to suit our programs and objectives. As General Stilwell told me, he believes the Agency is doing well by the Center but in the final analysis only the Agency knows what it has to offer and the Agency must determine to what extent it will help.

d. Because of the importance of monitoring the training programs at the Center, it is my view that the liaison officer assigned there should be subordinate directly to the Director or Deputy Director of Training. The liaison officer, however, must be in position to communicate directly with any Agency component. He need not funnel all of his correspondence through the Office of Training, but OTR should be saddled with the ultimate responsibility of providing guidance, advice, and answers 25x1 to questions for the liaison officer.

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A word about			25
nd the DOD/CIA-agreed functions he ach one of these terms of reference s follows (a copy of his functions is	with	terms of reference orm. I went over and they add up	25>
a. With a "delineation of the roles, mission of the roles, mission CIA and the Special Forces, this has so participated in one field any such delineation would be mather than at Fort Bragg or in	ions, and resist is more for training expenses at the limits of the limi	iction than fact. He ercise, but clearly Washington level	
b. 3.b. if for the reasons stated above, no but he does respond by providing is a frequent occurrence.	ot a channel	misnomer. He is, I for intelligence stud tudies if asked. This	ies, 25X1
of assistance and support to the	Center in to ood deal in and more time	this field. I told me on the rostrum	

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25x1	General Stilwell told me that he would like to do more of this, and more will no doubt be done. The Agency meanwhile should do more to provide some of the key instructors of the Center staff with the kind of specialized training that we can give at This was done on two occasions last year. It should be done more frequently, and should ensure (and I have spoken to him about this) that the Center instructors so trained should make use of this by applying what they learn in some of the training courses offered at the Center.	25X1 25X1
	e. With regard to 3.e. and assistance in the development of detailed unconventional warfare and special operations plans in support of unified commands, specific operational cases have not arisen to date. does, however, sit on the Center's planning committee which considers the details of plans in support of CINCLANT for field training exercises. This same procedure would apply in the event of real-situation planning.	
25X1	f. 3.e.(2) provides for the "exchange of operational information on a need-to-know basis."  does not receive many questions on this. They are a rarity and have come only once or twice and, on these occasions, from General Stilwell himself.	25X1
	g. With regard to 3.f. concerning mutual assistance in the area of logistics, this is not a particularly active account, but is in position to be of assistance if necessary.	
	RECOMMENDATIONS:	
	a. Maintain the Agency's liaison at the Center. To withdraw it would be completely misunderstood by the Center, which prides itself on the Agency's representation as well as representation from State, USIA, and AID.	
	b. Keep in this post but trans- fer his direct subordination from the Executive Director to the Director or Deputy Director of Training and make the Office	25X1

of Training responsible for keeping abreast of the job and for recommending a successor within the next year or so.

c. The Agency should take a new and deep look at the capabilities of the Special Warfare Forces of the U. S. military services with a view toward establishing relationships that can count on the use of such forces as appropriate.

If you agree with the first two recommendations,

I have attached a memorandum for your signature to be given to the Office of Training with copies to other offices who need to know about subordination and OTR's responsibilities. I am frank to say I am not at all certain as to how to proceed with the third recommendation. A paper directive is hardly likely to get the ball rolling. This requires some soul-searching and some discussions primarily with DD/P and SOD.

H. Knoche

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
Attachments

## AAAAAAA



## ATTACHMENT SEPARATOR SHEET

Approved For Release 2006/10/03: CIA-RDP80B01676R000700080002-7



## NOTE:

Copy sent to John Richardson, Director of Training, on 10 June. The copy sent to Mr. Richardson did not include subparagraph e at bottomof page 2 and top of page 3; also, on last page, the copy to Mr. Richardson ended with "...for keeping abreast of the job...."

BLPO/EXDIV